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Strength and power - conditions 
and doctrinal assumptions of the security 
policy of the Russian Federation
The end of the Cold War and disintegration of the Soviet Union marked the 
beginning of a new type of system of international and global security. The end of 
the Cold War rivalry and risk of global conflict built a sense of stability and changed 
perceptions of threats. However, recently, unprecedented incidents connected 
with the annexation of Crimea and armed conflicts in Eastern Ukraine have led to 
a change in the whole geopolitical situation, not only in Eastern Europe, but also 
across the globe.
These incidents signal an important change in the current state of international 
relations as well as a turning point in the perception of threats to international secu­
rity. The situation has also led to an altered understanding of security by the Russian 
Federation and the threats it faces - mostly posed by the Western world. Thus, this 
paper aims to present the process of evolution of the Russian Federation’s perception 
of threats to its own security, along with an analysis of the newest doctrinal assump­
tions in the security policy adopted by the Russian government in reaction to an 
open confrontation with the Western world.
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Evolution of the assumptions and concepts 
of security of the Russian Federation
The security policy of the Russian Federation has largely been determined by the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union. The first period of policy formation in the 1990s 
might be described by the phrase, “syndrome of ambitious weakness”. Russia at that 
time attempted to maintain its position as a global power of crucial importance for 
the new world order. Formally, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council 
and the owner of a huge nuclear arsenal, it was entitled to assume such an attitude. 
However, Russia’s real geopolitical position at that time was much weaker than before 
due to international considerations and internal problems, including political and 
economic chaos.
A major change in Russia’s international position and security policy was brought 
about when President Vladimir Putin assumed power in 2000. In addition, the world 
market’s demand for natural resources exported by the Russian Federation improved 
the economic condition of the country. Therefore, the government could spend much 
more money on the army after its functional downfall in the 1990s.
The following years witnessed the growing importance of the Russian Federa­
tion in the international arena, this was accompanied by increasingly complicated 
relations with Western nations, in particular the United States. A speech delivered 
by Vladimir Putin at the 43rd Munich Conference on Security was a clear indication 
of the change in Russia’s attitude and understanding of its role in the world. Putin 
attacked the USA and blamed them for creating a unipolar world. He also accused 
Western countries of expanding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which in his 
opinion was a breach of earlier agreements. Moreover, he declared that the planned 
installation of elements of an anti-missile shield in Central and Eastern Europe was 
an act aimed against Russia, to which he needed to react accordingly1.
1 “Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy”, at 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034, 21 September 2015; “Putin atakuje Stany 
Zjednoczone”, at http://www.wprost.pl/ar/101176/Putin-atakuje-Stany-Zjednoczone , 21 Septem­
ber 2015.
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Anti-Western Rhetoric
Anti-Western rhetoric has often been a common element in the narrative of the 
Russian Federation; this is also reflected in the history of official doctrinal docu­
ments referring to foreign policy and security. Depending on the needs determined 
by the domestic and international situation of the moment, Western nations were 
presented instrumentally, and with varied intensity, as foes intending to weaken the 
international position of the Russian Federation. The official narrative indicated that 
such attitude on the part of the West was motivated by a desire to counteract the 
growing importance and role of the Russian Federation worldwide.
The deciding moment in Russia’s intensified view of the West and the United 
States as the ‘principal threat’ to its security was the “revolution of dignity” inUkraine 
and the subsequent Russian annexation of Crimea, which resulted in conflict in the 
Ukraine’s Eastern provinces. These developments led to a radical deterioration in 
relations between Russia and Western nations, the causes and consequences of which 
were entirely different than those concerning the earlier events of 2014 in Ukraine.
The Western countries, like the new Ukrainian government, assumed that the 
“revolution of dignity” was a spontaneous reaction of society to the authoritarian rule 
of President Yanukovych. His deposition from function, on the other hand, was an 
effect of lack of realization of the settlement negotiated with the opposition on Febru­
ary 21, 2015 with the participation of foreign ministers from Germany (Frank Wal­
ter-Steinmeier) and Poland (Radosław Sikorski), and a representative from France 
(Eric Fournier)2. The West accused Russia of annexing Crimea, which was a violation 
of the principles and standards of international law and a breach of the terms of many 
bilateral and multilateral agreements signed by Russia.
2 O. Varfolomeye v, “Ukraine’s Ruling Party Faces Defections”, Eurasia Daily Monitorvol. 11, 
no. 34, at http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/itx_ttnewsltt_newsjM19998rtx_tt 
news[backPid]=7568cno_cache=l, 21 September 2015.
So-called ‘differences in interpretation also accompanied subsequent geo-polit­
ical developments, including the outbreak of conflict in Eastern Ukraine. According 
to Western countries, the conflict was provoked by Russia, which later threw gas on 
the proverbial fire by sending in arms and regular troops to the two Ukrainian dis­
tricts shaken by separatist movements.
Such an interpretation was entirely rejected by the Russian Federation, according 
to whom Ukraine suffered a coup plotted by covert services of the Western states, 
which led to the overthrowing of a legally elected incumbent President. Furthermore, 
the annexation of Crimea was described as a necessary act aimed at protecting local 
citizens against Kiev- fascists and Bandera followers.
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Russia was also highlighting the fact that the separation of Crimea from Ukraine 
was fully legal, thus international law had not been violated. The government of Rus­
sia describes the incorporation of the peninsula into the motherland as an act of 
“restorative justice” and the correction of a historic mistake: ie the handing of the area 
over to Ukraine under the USSR. Russia also rejects accusations that they provoked 
the conflict in eastern Ukraine and that they continue to support local separatists. 
It interprets the occurrences in the Donetsk and Lugansk districts as a spontaneous 
protest by citizens against the illegal seizure of power by the country’s opposition.
Social Consolidation
It is also worthy of note that the Russian authorities have been able to skilful­
ly heat up the patriotic and emotional atmosphere around Crimea. On the 18th of 
March 2015, during a speech opening the concert celebrating the first anniversary 
of annexation, Putin stated that the “incorporation” of Crimea did not stem from 
a desire to expand the territory of Russia, but was conditioned by the need for justice 
as well as historical reasons. He added that millions of Russians were endangered and 
expected the Russian state to provide help and support3.
3 “Concert celebrating Crimea and Sevastopol’s reunification with Russia”, 18 March 2015, at 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47878, 21 September 2015.
4 Происходящее в Украине, Крыму и реакция России, at http://www.levada.ru/26-03 
-2014/proiskhodyashchee-v-ukraine-krymu-i-reaktsiya-rossii, 21 September 2015.
5 “Владимир Путин: отношение и доверие”, at http://www.levada.ru/16-04-2014/vladimir- 
putin-otnoshenie-i-doverie, 21 September 2015.
Thanks to this type of rhetoric Russia experienced social consolidation and the 
government gained increasing support for their actions. The Russian public still 
backs the annexation and view it as a justified step and a necessary measure in help­
ing its citizens to “return” to the motherland in the face of a threat from Kiev’s na­
tionalists and Bandera followers. A poll carried out in March 2014 by the Russian 
Levada Centre found that 86% of the population share this view, whereas 8% claim 
that incorporation of Crimea was an annexation4. The research indicated increasing 
support for Putin’s policy, amounting to over 80 percent of the population.5
Favourable public opinion has not been affected by constantly changing accounts 
of the events in Crimea in 2014 as offered by Vladimir Putin. At first the President 
denied that Russian troops were engaged in any way in the annexation of the penin­
sula. He claimed that the so-called little green men were local self-defence fighters 
who simply purchased their military supplies in a shop. Several months later he stat­
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ed that the Russian military had participated in the organization of the referendum. 
Just before the anniversary of the annexation, in a documentary “Crimea. The Way 
Home.”, Putin admitted that the whole process had been planned and carried out by 
Russian soldiers and special forces, all of whom were acting on his orders6.
6 “Putin odpowiada na pytania Rosjan: Nasze wojsko było na Krymie. W Naddniestrzu pow­
inni o sobie zdecydować”, 17 April 2014, at http://www.gazetaprawna.pl/artykuly/791577,putin 
-odpowiada-na-pytania-rosjan-nasze-wojsko-bylo-na-krymie-w-naddniestrzu-powinni-o-sobie- 
zdecydowac.html, 21 September 2015; “Krymu „droga do ojczyzny”? Putin opowiada, jak wydał 
rozkaz aneksji półwyspu", 9 March 2015, at http://swiat.newsweek.pl/putin-w-filmie-dokumental 
nym-przyznaje-ze-nakazal-aneksje-krymu,artykuły,358637,l.html, 21 September 2015.
7 S. Blank, “Russia’s Military Doctrine Reflects Putins Paranoia and Siege Mentality”, Eur­
asia Daily Monitor vol. 12, no. 2, 6 January 2015, at http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/ 
single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=432378rtx_ttnews[backPid]=7868mo_cache=l, 21 September 2015.
8 “Президент утвердил новую редакцию Военной доктрины”, 26 December 2014, at 
http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47334,21 September 2015.
’ R. McDermott, “Putin Signs New Military Doctrine: Core Elements Unchanged”, Eur­
asia Daily Monitor vol. 12, no. 2, 6 January 2015, at http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/ 
single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=432368rtx_ttnews[backPid]=7868mo_cache=l, 21 September 2015.
10 “Военная доктрина Российской Федерации”, 30 December 2014, at http://www.rg.ru/ 
2014/12/30/doktrina-dok.html, 21 September 2014.
War Doctrine
A clear confirmation of the anti-Western rhetoric of the Russian Federation is 
also seen in doctrinal changes in perceptions of the security of the country. Although 
works on a new draft of the War Doctrine of the Russian Federation had been un­
derway since 2013, it was the Ukrainian conflict that to a great extent influenced the 
final shape of the document (despite the fact that it does not contain any direct refer­
ence to the conflict)7. The new war doctrine adopted by President Putin on the 26th 
of December 2014 indicates the West and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as 
the main threats to the security of the Russian state8 *10. In the opinion of the Russian 
strategists who prepared the document, the actions of the Western countries result 
from their will to weaken Russia, to counteract its growing importance in the world, 
and to undermine its independence in the international arena, including its foreign 
policy and security’.
The updated war doctrine consists of four parts, which present the main threats 
to the security of the Russian state as well as its military policy, actions, and undertak­
ings aimed at strengthening defensive potential and the state itself0.
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The document underlines that the doctrine is strictly defensive; however, Russia 
reserves the right to use its army in the face of aggression that threatens the state or 
its allies. The doctrine also indicates that the Russian army may be used abroad for 
international missions realized in conformity with the resolutions of the United Na­
tions Security Council or other international bodies responsible for security. Russia 
reserves the right to use the army to, „provide security to its citizens residing out of 
the borders of the Russian Federation”11. This last provision caused considerable con­
cern in the Baltic States and other countries with a sizeable Russian minority.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.; “Что доктрина прописала”, 29 December 2014, at http://www.rg.ru/2014/12/29/ 
doktrina.html, 21 September 2015.
14 Военная доктрина...
15 S. Blank, op. cit.
Any analysis of the doctrinal principles of Russia’s security policy should also 
include issues surrounding the use of nuclear weapons. The doctrine provides that 
Russia reserves the right to decide about using nuclear weapons in two cases:
• as a response to a nuclear attack on itself or one of its allies,
• to respond to a conventional attack on a scale which would threaten the founda­
tions of existence of the Russian Federation12.
As has been pointed out, the new version of the war doctrine possesses a clear an­
ti-West character. The main threat to Russian security comes form Western countries 
and their armed forces, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. One of the 
most significant dangers, according to Russia, is the strengthening of the military 
position of NATO and its establishment of goals with a global range, which Russia 
treats as a breach of the norms of international law. Other threats posed by NATO 
include its expansion plans and the building up of NATO’s military infrastructure in 
the countries bordering Russia13.
The doctrine also recognizes military manoeuvres and the distribution of troops 
in areas neighbouring Russia as a means of exerting political and military pressure. 
Russia pointed out that plans to place elements of an anti-missile shield in Central 
and Central-Eastern Europe severely undermine global stability and upset the estab­
lished balance of power in the nuclear sphere14.
The principal internal threat was defined as interference by foreign special forces 
from opponent countries aimed at overthrowing the legal Russian government, lead­
ing to social and political destabilization and a constitutional coup. Among other 
hostile activities, the doctrine mentions “foreign propaganda” designed to compro­
mise the fundamental spiritual and historical values, as well as the patriotic attitude, 
of Russian citizens15.
Strength and power - conditions and doctrinal assumptions... 35
The doctrine also indicates many other threats to Russia’s security, including 
global terrorism and extremism. The creators of the doctrine noted that international 
attempts to eliminate these threats are insufficient, thus eliminating this threat is of 
key importance to the worlds security. The document considers a terrorist assault 
with biological or chemical weapons or radioactive materials to be highly probable, 
thus this type of threat must be addressed effectively16.
16 Военная доктрина...
17 “Federal Security Service board meeting”, 26 March 2015, at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/ 
president/news/49006, 21 September 2015.
18 Ibid.
The Confrontational West
According to provisions laid out in the document, the details of the war doctrine 
are specified in presidential proclamations made to the Russian Federal Assembly. 
Official statements of Russian authorities referring to problems of security are also 
significant. These are often presented during sessions of state institutions responsible 
for maintaining order. In this context one should note President Putins meeting with 
the members of security forces held on the 26th of March 2015.
During the meeting the Russian President declared that the states security and 
functioning of the defnce and law enforcement institutions are particularly impor­
tant. He stated that 2014 was not the easiest time’ due to escalating tensions in the 
international arena, especially in the Middle East and other unstable regions, includ­
ing Ukraine. He stated that as a result of a coup Ukraine has been plunged into a civil 
war, however Russia was doing its best to settle the conflict and restore normality. 
Moreover, he added that the Russian state was striving to prevent humanitarian ca­
tastrophe and had thus admitted hundreds of thousands of refugees from Donbas 
into its territory.17.
Putin added that independent Russian policy and “help” offered to Ukraine seem 
to cause considerable irritation for some countries, which employ a whole range of 
activities to deter Russia from pursuing its policy. Such measures include: attempts 
to politically isolate the Russian State, exertion of economic pressures, the waging of 
information warfare, and the use of special forces18.
President Putin stressed that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization continues 
to develop rapid reaction forces and strengthen its infrastructure in the vicinity of 
Russian borders. Forcing the installation of components of anti-missile protection in 
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Europe and regions of Asia and the Pacific is a violation of established nuclear parity. 
Putin accused the US of repudiating the anti-missile protection treaty; in his opinion 
the decision ruined the foundations of the contemporary system of security19.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.; P. Bajor, “Od Kosowa po Donbas”, Nowa Europa Wschodnia, 2 April 2015, at http:// 
new.org.pl/2153,post.html, 21 September 2015.
21 Federal Security Service...
22 “Указ Президента Российской Федерации от 7 мая 2012 г. N 603 „О реализации планов 
(программ) строительства и развития Вооруженных Сил Российской Федерации, других 
войск, воинских формирований и органов и модернизации оборонно-промышленного 
комплекса””, 9 Мау 2012, at http://www.rg.ru/2012/05/09/vpk-dok.html, 21 September 2015.
During the same meeting Putin boasted the effectiveness of Russian special forc­
es: the data he quoted indicated that, thanks to their actions, the number of terrorist 
assaults in 2014 dropped by half (compared to 2013). According to the information 
he presented, the special forces prevented around 74 million cyber assaults aimed at 
Russian IT systems and detained over 300 collaborators and agents of foreign intelli­
gence. The Russian President stated that the foreign special services intend to contin­
ue their activities during the coming election campaigns in an effort to create chaos 
in the country. According to him, there are plans to create internal destabilization, 
which would be achieved by financing Russian associations and non-governmental 
organizations20.
The Russian President explicitly stated that, in spite of the threats, Russia would 
not allow itself to be intimidated. He stressed that the Russian state had never been 
intimidated, and the authorities will react to any internal and external threats to na­
tional security. He concluded that the international public would not respect Russia 
if it made concessions, but rather only if it would become stronger and stronger21.
Priority: Modernization
Taking the above into account, the authorities insisted that Russia react properly 
to the “challenges” coming from the West. In order to achieve this, and in spite of the 
financial crisis, they announced full realization of ambitious plans to modernize the 
Russian army. According to a decree issued by Putin on the 7th of May 2012, 70% 
of the army should be equipped with the state-of-the-art weapons.22. Deputy Prime 
Minister Dmitry Rogozin stated many times that the sanctions imposed by the West 
would not impede the implementation of this programme, which according to his 
knowledge had been so far carried out on schedule.
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These are important political declarations, which (regardless of possible setbacks 
in the implementation of individual upgrades) demonstrate the importance modern­
izing the army holds for the Russian authorities. Putin continues to repeat his senti­
ment that the only assurance of security for the Russian state is its military strength, 
which is held in esteem by Western countries and NATO: thus, he declares, it is nec­
essary to further finance the programme to professionalize the army.
Arctic Interests
A more and more important element in Russian policy is their plans for the Arc­
tic. Its role for international relations and global security continues to grow, mostly 
due to potential natural resources and new transportation routes. Russian interest in 
the region was presented in a document dated 18th September 2008, „Basic Guide­
lines for Russia’s State Policy in the Arctic to 2020 and Beyond”, and was also declared 
explicitly in the war doctrine23. In line with the priorities defined therein, Russian 
authorities recently made several crucial decisions.
23 “Основы государственной политики Российской Федерации в Арктике на период 
до 2020 года и дальнейшую перспективу”, 18 September 2008, at http://www.scrf.gov.ru/docu- 
ments/98.html, 21 September 2015; “The Russian Security Council met to discuss the protection 
of Russia’s national interests in the Arctic”, 17 September 2008, at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/ 
president/news/1433, 21 September 2015.
24 “О Государственной комиссии по вопросам развития Арктики”, 23 March 2015, 
at http://government.ru/docs/17319/, 21 September 2015; Р. Bajor, “Arktyczne napięcie”, New 
Eastern Europe, at http://www.new.org.p1/2101,post.html, 21 September 2015; И. Сафронов, 
Н. Городецкая, С. Горяшко, “Северный завхоз. Дмитрий Рогозин возглавит комиссию 
по управлению Арктикой”, 6 February 2015, at http://kommersant.ru/Doc/2661252, 21 Sep­
tember 2015. See also: H. Городецкая, К. Мельников, И. Сафронов, “Арктику возьмут 
на комиссию. Для управления ею создадут специальную структуру”, 24 November 2014, at 
http://kommersant.ru/doc/2617802, 21 September 2015.
At the end of 2014 the Combined Strategic Command “North” assumed its duties 
at the naval base of the North Fleet. The decision was made to construct naval bases 
in this area and establish a special body supervising their activities. Russian interests 
in the strategic region of the Arctic are to be guarded by the State Commission on 
Arctic Development Issues, created on 3rd February 2015 and based on President Pu­
tins decree. Several weeks later, on 14th March 2015 the Russian government passed 
a resolution confirming the principles of operation and goals of the new body24.
According to this act, the commission is a coordinating executive power organ 
responsible for increasing and guaranteeing the national security of Russia in the 
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Arctic zone. Its main tasks include: the protection of national interests in the Arctic, 
improving the administration of the area, and resolving key problems of a strategic 
character. Within its competences the commission will also coordinate the exploita­
tion of natural resources and strengthen Russia’s military presence in this territory25.
25 “Постановление от 14 марта 2015 г. № 228 Об утверждении Положения о Государ­
ственной комиссии по вопросам развития Арктики”, 23 March 2015, at http://government.ru/ 
docs/17319/, 21 September 2015.
26 Ibid.; И. Сафронов, С. Горяшк о, “Инстанция по всем торосам”, at http://kommersant. 
ru/doc/2688114, 21 September 2015.
Moreover, the document declares that the commission will act based on approved 
annual plans and its chairman is to be nominated by the President. The present nom­
inee is Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin. The commission may appoint ‘task 
teams’, and its sessions are to be summoned whenever deemed necessary, but at least 
once every six months. The commission’s decisions are binding and must be imple­
mented by every organ of federal executive power; however, their enforcement is 
conditioned by a special legal act issued by the Russian President or the government26.
Conclusions
Based on the above analysis we may conclude that the Ukrainian conflict resulted 
in changes in the geopolitical situation in Central and Eastern Europe and lowered 
the overall level of international security. One of the reasons for this is a radical de­
terioration in relations between Russia and the Western states and in particular with 
the United States of America. The West is considered a source of threat and danger. 
Russian authorities consequently continue to portray the West as an enemy who tries 
to weaken the Russian state and destabilize it internally; to do this they would employ 
special forces, which are suspected of infiltrating the non-governmental organiza­
tions with the aim of launching a coup d’etat and overthrowing the legal Kremlin 
government. The rhetoric of the Russian authorities indicates NATO as one of its 
main adversaries. The armed forces of the West are said to draw closer to Russia, all 
while strengthening their military potential, thus constituting a direct threat.
In summary, one may state that the events of 2014 initiated the worst crisis in the 
relations of the West with Russia since the times of the Cold War. It is unlikely that 
this situation will be overcome in the foreseeable future.
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Abstract
The article presents the analysis of the circumstances and the doctrinal assumptions behind 
Russian security policy since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The evolution of the security 
concept and Russia’s perception of its own role and significance on the international arena is 
discussed here. The changes occurring in the Russian security policy since President Putin 
came to power are also analysed. The text discusses also the newest concepts concerning 
security adopted in the War Doctrine with the threats for the Russian state coming from the 
West and presented in that document.
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